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Introduction 
 
Within business studies, Corporate Responsibility
1
 (CR) is increasingly accepted as 
an uncontested broker between sustainable development and free market liberalism. 
CR, following the definition of the EU Commission (2006, 2) is „a concept whereby 
companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations 
and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis‟. It has proven to 
be a flexible yet powerful concept that has established itself at the core of managerial 
discourses. In the words of Robert Strauss (2006), head of Employment and Social 
Affairs of European Commission, „everybody is in favour of [CR]. Nobody can be 
against it. It‟s like motherhood and apple pie‟.   
  The notion that „social responsibility‟ should be a focal issue for business is by no 
means new. 50 years ago, as a response to proponents of the business social 
responsibility agenda published in Harvard Business Review, Theodore Levitt (1958), 
a thinker who by no stretch of imagination could be seen as opposed to the interests of 
business, argued the following: 
 
What started out as the sincere personal viewpoints of a few selfless 
businessmen became the prevailing vogue for them all. Today pronouncements 
about social responsibility issue forth so abundantly from corporations that it is 
hard for one to get a decent play in the press (42)...[The danger is that the] 
corporation would eventually invest itself with all-embracing duties, obligations 
and finally powers – ministering to the whole man and molding him and society 
in the image of the corporation‟s narrow ambitions and its essentially unsocial 
needs. (44) 
 
Today, in the era of corporate citizenship, such a position could seem almost anti-
corporate. Yet from a purely profit-minded perspective, arguments about the 
corporation‟s narrow ambitions and unsocial needs would seem to make sense. The 
question thus becomes: where is the flaw in this proposition according to today‟s 
advocates of CR? In this paper, we set out to examine what has and has not changed 
since Levitt‟s warning was formulated, in order to understand the proposed shift put 
forward by business-minded actors. The analysis is framed in terms of context; 
thinking; practice; content; and consequences.  
In this theoretical paper, we examine general CR trends as articulated by 
influential proponents and as illustrated by: 1) the case of Botnia in Uruguay, which 
has recently generated much discussion and controversy in international media
2
; and 
                                                 
1
 Although the term corporate social responsibility (CSR) is more commonly used today than CR, there 
are indications that the latter may be becoming the preferred term, and it conveys better the 
responsibility for both social and environmental issues; thus we opt for using CR instead of CSR 
throughout the text. 
2
 The case deals with the construction of a eucalyptus pulp mill by the Finnish company Botnia near 
the town of Fray Bentos, close to the Uruguayan-Argentinian border, and the crisis that this process led 
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2) other prominent examples of CR-practicing companies, in order to demonstrate that 
similar patterns to those seen in the Botnia case are visible in many other cases.   
In the following section we further position our argument by reflecting on some 
existing critical perspectives and describing what type of critique we intend to deliver 
towards CR, before proceeding to describe our approach in some detail. We then 
introduce two definitions of what we see as the dominant articulation of CR today, 
and briefly discuss what we think they entail. Our analysis of CR context, thinking, 
practice, content and consequences follows, illustrated by our focal case and other 
examples. Finally, we attempt to open up our discussion in a constructive conclusion. 
 
On criticising CR 
 
In order for our discussion of CR to be as clear as possible, we differentiate 
between 1) CR as a signifier used by different actors (this is what we refer to as CR in 
this paper), 2) CR discourse as one that is in principle open to different articulations 
(henceforth CRD) and 3) what we see as the overwhelmingly dominant articulation of 
CR discourse in today‟s world (henceforth CRHA)
3
. It is important to note that our 
endeavour here is „critical‟, in a way that has been rather foreign to CRHA and even 
CRD as a whole so far: within it, there seem to be few opposing agendas because of an 
unproblematic adoption of „best practice‟ as overarching principle, and critical 
perspectives are thus marginalized (Banerjee, 2006). But as ten Bos (2006, 30) 
reminds us, there is „some strangeness in a world that generally does not manifest any 
doubt whatsoever about the goodness of its own endeavour. Contestation is thus all 
that matters here‟. It is important to critically explore taken-for-granted assumptions 
that freeze the social order (Alvesson and Willmott, 2003). In contesting the non-
conflictive nature of CRHA, we adopt a critical perspective in the broad spirit of 
critical theory (e.g. Adorno, 1981; Marcuse, 1964), seeking to question taken-for-
granted understandings and denaturalize what has been established in CRHA as 
unproblematically good for nature and society.   
However, we do not contend that there is no opposition to CRHA within CRD or 
that there are no alternative perspectives on sustainable development (SD). Opposing 
voices of ecofeminist (e.g. Shiva, 1988), ecomarxist (Peet and Watts, 1996), 
Foucauldian (Escobar, 1995) and/or postcolonial (Banerjee, 2003) inspirations have 
been vocal in the critique of SD as based on a modernist westernocentric ideology of 
„developmentalism‟ wherein the word „development‟ has been appropriated to further 
strengthen the domination of the economic over the social (Doane, 2005). While CR 
is a contested concept, „a religion filled with priests‟ (Porter, 2003), it does not imply 
that there is no dominant view of what it entails. In fact, its loose definition can be 
seen as central to how it is „used‟ (mostly discursively) by business: it is, by definition 
                                                                                                                                            
to. It is outside the scope of this paper to describe the unfolding of the crisis in detail, but a summary of 
the main events can be found in Appendix 1. 
3
 What we refer to as CRHA is what we would call, drawing on discourse theory (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985), the „hegemonic articulation‟ of CRD, i.e. the business-driven view of CR that prevails today, and 
we focus on this articulation here for the following reasons: 1) we see it as overwhelmingly dominant 
in today‟s „public‟ discourse on CR, in the mass media and corporate communication; 2) it is supported 
by an extensive body of positivist academic research on CR, providing legitimacy for its instrumental 
aims (see Scherer and Palazzo, 2007); and 3) it would be falling into a trap of this dominant articulation 
to accept that there are many different perspectives on CR which are all equally valuable – we see this 
posture as a trick to appropriate and neutralize all critique as part of CRHA. This hegemonic 
articulation, however, does not completely prevent CRD from remaining open to (hitherto 
marginalized) alternative articulations. 
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as it were, „always being redefined to serve changing needs and times‟ (Holliday et 
al., 2002, 103). As we will argue, what is the most significant characteristic of CR 
does not lie in its definition, but in whose „needs‟ are being „served‟ through CR. 
 
Our approach 
 
In this theoretical paper, our critical approach consists of two main steps: 1) a 
theoretical analysis of CRHA, which draws on mainstream CR literature, with a 
specific focus on what we see as the most influential driving force behind CRHA (see 
also Corporate Watch, 2006; Rutherford, 2006), the World Business Council of 
Sustainable Development (WBCSD); and 2) illustrations of our main theoretical 
points through a number of different cases, with a more systematic focus on the case 
of a WBCSD member, Botnia (as part of the Metsäliitto group). For this more focal 
case we rely on different types of secondary material, including documents made 
available by Botnia (Botnia, 2006; 2007; Faroppa and Annala, 2004), NGO and 
watchdog communication (Greenpeace Argentina, 2006; Pierri, 2006), more general 
printed, electronic and visual media accounts, as well as our own observations during 
two events: 1) the screening of a documentary film titled La historia de dos orillas 
(„The story of two shores‟) and the panel discussion that followed at the Helsinki Film 
Festival in September 2006; and 2) the OtaEco congress in November 2006 where the 
CR representative of Botnia spoke on the case of Fray Bentos (Annala, 2006). We 
complement our illustrations from the Botnia case with further examples illustrating 
similar patterns in order to show that the dynamics at hand are by no means unique to 
the Botnia case.  
It is our contention that when dealing with CRHA, the boundaries between text, 
discourse and practice are particularly blurred: we see the corporate texts and other 
corporate communication material as part of the very practice of the CRHA version of 
CR – and to some extent as constituting the substantial core of this practice. That is 
why it makes full sense to us to use what would otherwise be considered as 
„secondary data‟: CR communication, i.e. communication inherently aimed at 
stakeholders, explicitly is our main object of study. Research interviews would not 
provide manifestations of CRHA per se: in the interview setting, what most 
importantly defines the researchers‟ function is not their being stakeholders. 
It should be noted that  the examples we use to illustrate our views should not be 
seen as extreme cases of bad corporate practice. Rather, we have selected examples in 
which corporations can be seen as acting in what CRHA conceptualizes as a 
responsible way, in its guiding – however loose – principles of action. Thus, we see 
these cases as exemplary of the dangers that CRHA represents: it is not that CR is 
„wrongly‟ applied by corporations; CRHA is the problem. What attracted our attention 
to the Botnia case was the way in which Botnia claimed to act in the most responsible 
way possible while denying responsibility for a political crisis largely caused by its 
actions: we thus found this case exemplary of the tensions in CRHA between 
„responsibility‟ and business rationality, and we felt that using it as a main illustration 
would be particularly insightful. 
To guide our analysis we use the dimensions of context, thinking, practice, content 
and consequences of CRHA
4
. There certainly are overlaps between these dimensions, 
                                                 
4
 This framework for our analysis was initially inspired by the formulation of a call for papers about 
critical reflections on CR, for a forthcoming special issue of the Scandinavian Journal of Management. 
While writing up a previous version of this paper, we felt that covering each of these five aspects in 
turn made it possible to address our main critiques of CRHA in an insightful, fairly comprehensive way. 
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and thus some of our analysis is positioned fairly arbitrarily within one category 
rather than the other. For each of these five dimensions, we focus on one main feature 
of CRHA that displays at best „false consciousness‟ (see e.g. Marcuse, 1964) and at 
worst a deliberate attempt at deception. But our aim is not to determine whether CRHA 
purposely misleads people; rather, we seek to expose how what CR is claimed to be 
about by its business proponents tends to be very different from what a great deal of 
evidence shows it to be. We thus engage in a type of deconstruction where the key 
signifiers asserted in CRHA, such as the concern for „sustainability‟, the „proactive‟ 
nature of CRHA, its „responsible‟ ethos or its „win-win‟ outcomes are contrasted with 
evidence that points to the opposite direction, like the focus on „growth‟, how CRHA 
can be seen as „reactive‟ and dealing with society and itself in a fundamentally 
„irresponsible‟ manner, or how it may lead to „lose-lose‟ situations. 
To us CRHA is deeply problematic not only because it freezes reality (e.g. Adorno, 
1981) through asserting its own hegemonic truth about stakeholders and nature, a 
truth in which potentially progressive institutions such as UNEP and the EU have 
seemingly come to have blind faith. It is problematic also because it represents a real 
threat for the sustainability, not only of livelihoods and nature, which have always 
been threatened by corporate practices, but also of the corporation itself: in our 
deconstruction we also seek to expose how CRHA is internally flawed. 
 
Defining CR 
 
Two established definitions of CR follow, from WBCSD and the EU respectively, 
representing the CRHA stance: 
 
[CR is] the commitment of business to contribute to sustainable economic 
development, working with employees, their families, the local community and 
society at large to improve their quality of life…[CR] is a fundamental concept – 
like liberty or equality – that is always being redefined to serve changing needs 
and times. (Holliday et al, 2002, 103, emphases added) 
 
[CR] is a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental 
concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis. It is about enterprises deciding to go beyond 
minimum legal requirements and obligations stemming from collective 
agreements in order to address societal needs. (EU Commission, 2006, 2, 
emphases added) 
 
The first definition shows that CRHA is connected to the broader notion of 
„sustainable development‟. Indeed, the whole CRHA endeavour can be viewed as an 
attempt by corporate actors, largely coordinated by WBCSD (initially called BCSD) 
since the 1992 Rio Earth summit, to appropriate the SD goal (Banerjee, 2003; 
Corporate Watch, 2006; Haque, 1999). Situating CR at the same level as liberty and 
equality gives an indication of the envisioned scope of the CR concept: it is meant to 
affect the whole of society. At the same time, it remains loosely defined, and can 
always be redefined in terms of „changing needs‟. This begs the question: „whose 
needs should be served?‟ In CRHA, the served needs are those of society, whose needs 
will be identified through stakeholder interaction. This stakeholder perspective 
essentially means, however, that as relevant stakeholders are identified and defined 
by the corporation, so are the societal needs. It provides no indication on how the 
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corporation could decide in specific situations of stakeholder conflict, whose need is 
more relevant or whose interest is stronger (Banerjee, 2006; Weiss, 1995). This 
vagueness regarding „societal needs‟ can be seen as opening up an avenue for a 
corporate appropriation of the soci(et)al. 
The second definition provides insight in how CRHA is about „voluntary‟ action. 
The implicit expectation is that if corporations acknowledge social and environmental 
issues then governments will not have to regulate (Doane, 2005). As long as 
corporate action, however marginally, exceeds „minimum legal requirements‟ to 
address the corporate-defined „societal needs‟, then it is part of CR. The proposition 
of going beyond what the law requires also implies that there is little room for 
accountability: everything is to be „voluntary‟ and not constrained by legal 
frameworks. Both definitions are loose enough for an increasing number of 
corporations to adopt CR. 
Let us now turn to our critical analysis of CRHA. 
 
Context: the need for ‘sustainability’ or the need for ‘growth’? 
 
There is nothing mysterious about the social responsibility syndrome. It does 
not reflect a change in businessmen‟s nature or the decay of self-interest. 
(Levitt, 1958, 43) 
 
From a sustainability perspective the challenge for corporations is how to shift 
away from the modernist view considering nature as a resource that can be exploited 
forever, which implies questioning the belief in limitless economic growth. Central to 
CRHA, however, is an understanding that it is possible to achieve both sustainable and 
limitless growth: what chiefly needs to be sustained is profit (Escobar, 1995). This 
view is manifested in the conceptualization of SD within CR. Business proponents of 
CR, such as the members of WBCSD, define SD through growth: „not only was [SD] 
not anti-growth but it also called for serious economic growth to meet the needs of the 
current population‟ (Holliday et al., 2002, 15). Meeting these needs will allegedly be 
possible through the CR concept of „sustainable growth‟ coined by Paul Tebo, former 
CR director of DuPont (ibid.). The shift from growth to sustainable growth is 
exemplified through the development of DuPont‟s own stance on sustainable 
development. Implementing an aggressive „first deny, then delay‟-strategy (Doyle 
1991) towards environmental issues at the end of the 1980s, DuPont changed course 
from being rabidly anti-CR to fervently pro-CR.  
Today, DuPont‟s very active CR practice is manifested in its membership in 
WBCSD, the US Climate Action Partnership (USCAP), and the Green Power Market 
Development Group; its signing the Greenhouse Gas Protocol Initiative and the UN 
Global Compact; its several CR reports; its being listed on Dow Jones Sustainability 
Indexes and FTSE4Good; as well as its #1 ranking on Business Week's 2005 list of 
„The Top Green Companies‟. At the same time DuPont is still ranked first in the 
Toxic 100 list of the top corporate air polluters in the United States (PERI, 2008). The 
point is not that DuPont tops a list of polluters (the Toxic 100 features 17 other 
members of WBCSD) but that in the CRHA perspective there is little or no paradox in 
a situation where a corporation is a champion of CR, all while being one of the worst 
polluters. This shows that within CRHA there are few if any opposing agendas. From 
the perspective of sustainable growth, you can bake the cake, sell it, eat it, and keep it 
in store for future generations.  
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In our view, this apparent lack of paradox in concepts such as sustainable growth 
has to be contextualized in the broader neoliberal context, in which it is natural to put 
all faith in the market. The latter has seemingly been naturalized as the one truth: a 
ubiquitous reference point for whoever is serious about discussing not only business 
issues, but also politics and society. The overarching neoliberal thinking also entails a 
rejection of government regulation, and here we touch upon a central feature of CRHA: 
it provides fertile ground for a lobbying movement designed to help in the corporate 
struggle against regulation (e.g. Corporate Watch, 2006). This does not mean that 
government should be excluded, but that it should be co-opted and join in the 
promotion of voluntary action over regulation. Although it has the guise of both 
neutrality through its reliance on technological and technocratic expertise and 
philanthropy through its claimed aims of making the world better, CRHA, we contend, 
should be seen as furthering the interests of an ideological movement chiefly designed 
to help large corporations in their quest for a better image, risk mitigation, license to 
operate in a given community, less demanding regulation – and, ultimately, power 
(see e.g. Banerjee, 2006). 
The case of Botnia illuminates these contextual issues in two ways. Both relate to 
how Botnia contextualize their own investment in Uruguay. First, this 
contextualization reveals a view of the market as only horizon: during a presentation 
made by a Botnia CR representative (Annala, 2006), the legitimization for the 
Uruguayan plant was established by drawing on a Greenpeace article (Greenpeace 
Argentina, 2006), which was claimed to show how the paper market is growing so 
fast that in order to meet the demand, two plants like Botnia would be needed every 
year. This displays a belief in market demand as something that is objectively, 
inevitably and „naturally‟ growing and that as such cannot be questioned, as if the 
demand was not growing as a result of other processes favouring increased 
consumption for purposes of „wealth creation‟ and „growth‟. Second, the 
legitimization was made by appropriating NGO discourse. This is a CR trick to 
connect the „need for sustainability‟ context to their own actions and present these as 
though they contribute to sustainability - even when it is clear that what they 
contribute to is more resource depletion in the name of („sustainable‟) growth. It is 
notable that only a small part of the Greenpeace article was referred to, the part 
commenting the evolution of demand, while the full message was not revealed. In 
particular, this very article problematized the growth of demand as unsustainable, and 
pointed out the detrimental effects it had on developing regions as paper companies 
are expanding their production. 
Sustainability arguments were thus turned on their heads as they were used to 
legitimize a „sustainable‟ behaviour while hiding dimensions of environmental decay. 
This reflects a typical way in which corporate actors attempt to make CR convincing: 
by presenting themselves as on the same side as influential NGOs – for instance when 
ExxonMobil is cooperating with the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation to „save 
the tiger‟ (NFWF, 2008) – they raise the legitimacy of their environmental claims. 
As a conclusion regarding how context has changed compared to when Levitt 
(1958) formulated his critique towards „social responsibility‟, today the neoliberal 
view has become so hegemonic that, in the circles that deliberate on important 
governance questions, it is virtually impossible to challenge the notion that „the 
market‟ and „growth‟ should be placed above everything else, thereby making it 
possible to appropriate concern for sustainability and instead transform it into a need 
for „sustainable growth‟. In addition, nowadays it is possible to deem all regulation as 
by definition counterproductive because it is considered to „distort the market‟. In this 
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context, CRHA is useful to corporations as a discursive resource to promote the 
oxymoronic notion of „sustainable growth‟ and lobby against regulation in face of the 
sustainability challenge. 
 
Thinking: ‘proactive’ or ‘reactive’? 
 
Self-conscious dedication to social responsibility may have started as a 
purely defensive maneuver against strident attacks on big corporations and 
on the moral efficacy of the profit system. But defence alone no longer 
explains the motive. (Levitt, 1958, 41) 
 
A central component of CRHA is the emphasis on its voluntary nature, i.e. on 
voluntarily going beyond legal frameworks. This implies little or no possibility of 
accountability: CRHA does not imply „owing‟ anything to anyone, what is deemed 
ultimately relevant societal responsibilities is defined by the company itself. As a 
result, CR often becomes purely a matter of PR (see e.g. Frankenthal, 2001). A related 
issue is that historically, CRHA was not born out of the „proactive‟ concern for society 
and/or the environment. When it emerged in the 1990s it was largely due to major 
crises for big corporations, such as Bhopal for Union Carbide, sweatshops for Nike, or 
Brent Spar and the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa for Shell. Thus, this revival of CR, 
and its real historical take-off as a hegemonizing discourse within business, came as a 
result of reactive action, desperate attempts to manage crises that jeopardized the 
profits and possibly the very existence of some of the mammoths of world business.  
In our focal case, an analysis of Botnia‟s web site shows how reactive CR 
communication tends to be: the site used to be rather low-profile, conveying the 
image of a no-nonsense, business-minded company. But when events in Uruguay 
escalated, a new site was launched. Similar to those of many „CR-believing‟ 
companies, the site looked like that of a green NGO, laden with images of nature 
(water on both sides of the frame, plants and trees corresponding to two of the three 
main links on the homepage, „the environment‟ and „the Uruguay project‟) and just 
one technological picture of „the modern pulp mill‟ (by „modern‟, read „socially 
responsible‟ of course). In addition, Spanish was added as optional language as 
further evidence of the company‟s new stakeholders. The web site has since changed 
several times, to a more minimalistic design, but one that displays appropriate concern 
for all stakeholders.  
 It cannot be claimed that Botnia became aware of CR only as a result of the Fray 
Bentos crisis, because Metsäliitto (Botnia‟s parent company) has been a member of 
WBCSD for years. However, to us it is the crisis that has changed how Botnia 
attempts to integrate CR into its image and identity. In a sense this illustration marks a 
failure of CR implementation on the part of Botnia; the (CR) reaction of Botnia came 
too late. Relying mainly on the fact that Uruguay was considered politically stable, 
Botnia did not assess the political and social risks related to the factory location 
properly, perhaps due to its relative lack of internationalization experience (Lehtinen, 
2007). However, this is not to say that good CR practitioners would have necessarily 
been more proactive in their concern for society or nature. We see CRHA‟s alleged 
proactive stance as a matter of anticipating financial risks. For example, on the 
question of employing low-cost suppliers from developing countries, and the risk of 
bad work conditions there, a truly proactive stance would be to pay such rates that 
could help improve health and safety conditions. We can relate such a stance to 
Aragón-Correa and Sharma‟s (2003, 73) definition of „proactive postures‟ – limited 
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by the authors to corporate environmental strategy, but we believe it could also be 
used to describe „proactive thinking‟ on social issues – as involving „[1] anticipating 
future regulations and social trends and [2] designing or altering operations, 
processes, and products to prevent (rather than merely ameliorate) negative 
environmental [and social] impacts‟. In our view, the stance described above would 
correspond to the latter part of this definition (marked as [2] above). Even though this 
part suggests an unconditional interest in preventing negative impacts on society, 
within CRHA literature the examined benefits of proactiveness are exclusively from 
the company‟s viewpoint, in terms of potential competitive advantages and the 
anticipation of risks to the economic bottomline. This reveals the misleading nature of 
proactiveness conceived as unconditional corporate action for the better good of 
society: even „exemplary responsible corporations‟ like Nokia outsource to East Asia 
in the hunt for cheap labour (see Balmes, 2004). In our view, and in line with the 
former part of Aragón-Correa and Sharma‟s (2003) definition, anticipating and 
managing risks that may affect profits is what proactiveness is about: hiring an 
auditing agency is sufficient proactive action because as long as corporations subject 
their suppliers to the auditing ritual (with visits announced in advance), they are less 
likely to be held responsible for sweatshop scandals. 
So what has changed in terms of thinking since Levitt‟s (1958) critique? We 
contend that there has been no real shift to „proactive‟ thinking for the great majority 
of CR-promoting corporations; rather, what CRHA tends to do is to disguise its 
fundamentally reactive, crisis-addressing - or at best risk-mitigating- function into a 
proactive care for the social and the environment. 
 
Practice: ‘responsibility’ or ‘irresponsibility’ – or ‘aresponsibility’? 
 
If it does not pay, there is no game...when it comes to choosing between the 
small Arkansas supplier whose town would be ruined and the Minneapolis 
supplier who can make it cheaper, there is no doubt that even the most socially 
responsible corporation will take the latter. (Levitt, 1958, 43)   
 
CRHA signifies a shift from a rationality of accountability to a rationality of 
responsibility. This is connected to the notion of „voluntary‟ action discussed 
previously. But to us, the very idea that corporations can be „responsible‟ towards 
society and the environment is itself an irresponsible posture, because it causes 
demands from society that are never to be met given the current narrow definition of 
corporations as above all having to maximize value for the shareholders. The Dodge 
vs. Ford Motor Company case in 1919 established that „a business organization is 
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders‟ and that 
„directors cannot shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the mere 
incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting others‟ (as 
cited by Regan, 1998). This implies that all corporate promises regarding 
environmental and social issues can only be delivered if there is a clear „business 
case‟, i.e. if it will create value for the shareholders. This represents a fundamental 
limit on what CR, consisting of voluntary corporate action as it does, can deliver. 
Corporations may not be „irresponsible‟ but they should be expected to be by 
definition „aresponsible‟ towards society and nature. This does not mean that they 
should not be expected to be responsible towards their legal and basic societal 
obligations, i.e. following legislation, paying taxes, etc. This is the minimum 
expectation, but beyond that not much more should be expected. This is also for the 
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good of the corporation, as its legal definition makes wide-ranging promises 
undeliverable: when faced with a situation where profits stand at odds with e.g. 
conservation of nature, fighting poverty or protecting the rights of indigenous 
populations, the corporation has to choose profits. A corporation can only engage in 
„ethical duties‟ when this engagement provides a bottomline payoff. Tobacco 
companies will not voluntarily stop selling tobacco to the poor even if they know that 
the health hazards are even greater in regions with no functioning healthcare system, 
and oil companies will not stop lobbying for drilling permits in natural reserves even 
if they know that it will alter and deteriorate nature. What is irresponsible is not only 
to (pretend to) believe that corporations can be the main actors in addressing social 
and environmental challenges only through voluntary action; what is most 
irresponsible is corporations making undeliverable promises, which will continue to 
deteriorate their image and make them be seen as increasingly untrustworthy, thereby 
fuelling public cynicism, anti-corporate movements, and thus further polarizing 
society.  
The notion of „responsibility‟ in CR practice can be questioned in several ways in 
Botnia‟s case. First, regarding the free trade zones, is it „responsible‟ social behaviour, 
let alone progressive action, not to pay taxes and thus not to contribute to public 
wealth in the local social context one is based in? Consider the following citation 
from Botnia‟s „CSR in Uruguay‟ report: 
 
[Botnia participates in] many programmes to enhance the well-being and 
employment opportunities… these include: Traffic safety campaign; Courses 
for entrepreneurs in business management; IT literacy courses and “Basketball 
for everyone”-campaign to support sport activities for children (Botnia, 2007)   
 
Instead of only „supporting causes that it finds important‟ (Botnia, 2006, 27), and 
thus being „proactive‟ as promoted by CRHA, a socially responsible company should 
be expected to pay taxes in full, and let the population decide through its elected 
government (especially in a well-working democracy like Uruguay) where the money 
should be spent in order to enhance the social well-being in the community. By not 
paying taxes the corporation can use money for other purposes that may seem 
proactively philanthropic but that may still be less beneficial for society than the basic 
principle of contributing to public „wealth creation‟.  
Second, the notion of „best available technology‟ (BAT) which is central in the 
discussions regarding Botnia‟s mill in Uruguay does not guarantee as such that the 
level of pollution will be bearable for the local ecosystem to be preserved. CRHA is 
fundamentally based on the notion of „best practice‟: the idea is that if a practice is the 
best that has been established, it is as such responsible. But can the best practice in 
conducting an activity that is per se generally detrimental to the environment be 
deemed „responsible‟? Does that not deprive the term „responsible‟ of all meaning? 
Third, local livelihoods will definitely be affected adversely: tourism – particularly 
in the Argentinian town of Gualeguaychú – will be harmed by the worry for pollution; 
the fishing industry in the region is jeopardized (Donovan, 2007); and the introduction 
of eucalyptus monoculture will negatively impact local agriculture (Pierri, 2006). 
Fourth, Botnia‟s „irresponsibility‟ is most emphatically demonstrated in terms of 
the consequences that the building of its pulp mill has caused in terms of social and 
political turmoil in the region. Interestingly, when asked about their opinion regarding 
the political crisis between Uruguay and Argentina, Botnia representatives revert to 
their role as a business whose business is to mean business: if there are growing 
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tensions between Uruguay and Argentina, it is „none of their business‟. The 
stakeholder approach is then turned on its head: 
 
Botnia is not a party to the dispute between the Uruguayan and Argentine 
governments, but works in the background to help resolve the conflict as far as 
it can. (Botnia, 2006, 28) 
 
This can be seen as sound behaviour from a business-minded viewpoint but from 
an alleged „socially responsible‟ one, it leaves much to be desired. Being „responsible 
for‟ in CRHA can only be a positive notion; when it comes to determining who is 
„responsible for‟ social or political crises caused at least partly by business, denying 
responsibility becomes the name of the game, as e.g. when child labour in the garment 
industry is blamed on „unscrupulous subcontractors‟ alone. 
As a conclusion regarding CR practice, we do not see the potential for corporations 
to be more „responsible‟ today than 50 years ago. To us corporations tend to be 
„aresponsible‟, needing to prioritize the business bottomline. For instance, protecting 
the natural resources only makes sense for a corporation as long as there are other, 
preferably cheaper, resources available. When the corporation sees no such 
opportunity, it will revert to a narrow financial rationale. It should be obvious that 
corporations cannot have it both ways, appropriating social and environmental 
responsibilities when it suits them and then abandoning them when there is a crisis or 
perceived lack of business opportunities.  
 
Content: substantial or empty, neutral or biased? 
 
What we have, then, is the frightening spectacle of a powerful functional 
economic group whose future and perception are shaped in a tight materialistic 
context of money and things but which imposes its narrow ideas about a broad 
spectrum of unrelated noneconomic subjects on...society. (Levitt, 1958, 44)  
 
What do companies do when they marginally go „beyond minimum legal 
requirements‟ – i.e. when they do CR, according to the EU definition? „Reporting‟ is 
certainly the main CR activity there is. What is the content of this reporting? 
According to Banerjee (2006) most of the information that is included in CR reporting 
tends to be about legal requirements. What goes beyond the minimum legal 
requirements tends to be the reporting itself. In that sense, the content of CR very 
often is misleadingly substantial: the reports are thick and seemingly contain much 
information, but the actual extent of what is done beyond legal requirements remains 
limited. Reports usually consist of „feel-good‟ cases and anecdotes as well as nice 
visuals showing happy people and pristine natural landscapes that are presumably 
assumed to contribute to a pleasant feeling for the reader. This is problematic since, 
not only are success stories „not sufficient evidence‟ (Cerin, 2004, 312), they are also 
diverting the attention from the more general impact(s) that corporations have on 
society and nature. 
Standards for reporting have admittedly been developed. The Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) is increasingly accepted as the standard but with a mechanism for 
accountability missing it does not ensure a truthful account. There is an ongoing 
debate whether CR reports need to be truthful and whether they are commercial or 
non-commercial speech (cf. Ki, 2004), since in the absence of accountability the 
reports can include untruthful elements. Just as CR allegedly needs to be „redefined to 
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serve changing needs and times‟ (see WBCSD definition quoted previously), it is 
claimed by companies that the way their reporting is designed needs to be extensively 
adapted to their particular needs. As a result, companies themselves define what 
should and should not be reported upon. 
That GRI is presented as one of the greatest achievements of CR and a step 
towards more accountability is revealing of the central importance of reporting in the 
CR activity of companies; we use reports as a proxy for content because their very 
function is to report on the most important content of a company‟s CR. These reports 
tend to be thick documents that give the impression of very rigorous, objective 
reporting, masquerading for accountability.  
In the case of Botnia‟s environmental impact assessment (EIA) regarding the pulp 
mill in Fray Bentos, even the summary (Faroppa and Annala, 2004) is about 100 
pages long. The assessment draws on insights from different sciences (such as 
biology, geology, hydrogeology, social sciences and economics) making it hard even 
for individual scientists to fully understand all implications. As a result, reviewing the 
assessment requires close examination by several experts. For this type of documents 
companies rely on advanced scientific and technological knowledge, and as Marcuse 
(1964) has shown, this „technological rationality can sidetrack ethical concerns in 
favour of technical, formulaic analysis of problems‟ – which may „lead [people] who 
are otherwise capable of political and moral reflection to defer to technical experts 
who „depoliticize‟ the process‟ (Jermier and Forbes, 2003, 165). The dominant view 
that science and technology are as such „neutral‟ certainly contributes to this 
„depoliticization‟, that is, the removal of the ideological bias guiding the findings of 
these assessments; this characteristic of „scientific‟ research has made it possible for 
Exxon to contribute to delay a consensus in the public awareness of climate change, 
for instance. In Botnia‟s case, the Argentinian government and stakeholders strongly 
contested the assessment. A later assessment made by the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC, 2006) confirmed Botnia‟s results and gave them more „neutral‟ 
legitimacy – even though the Argentinian environment secretary noted that some of 
the same people had been involved in both assessments and that the new report 
contained a number of factual errors contributing to minimizing the pollution threat. 
As a conclusion, the content of CR is not as „neutral‟ as its use of seemingly 
rigorous scientific approaches suggests. Neither is it as substantial as the thickness of 
CR reports would indicate. Not much seems to have changed since Levitt‟s (1958) 
claims that social responsibility should not be left to companies: the „happy new 
orthodoxy‟ (Levitt, 1958, 42), whether 50 years ago or today, is mostly a matter of 
communicating feel-good cases celebrating highly anecdotal corporate action that is 
meant to conceal the emptiness of CR, or at least its considerably limited nature. 
 
Consequences: ‘win-win’ or ‘lose-lose’? 
 
At the rate that we are going there is more than a contingent probability that, 
with all its resounding good intentions, business statesmanship will create the 
corporate equivalent of the unitary state. (Levitt, 1958, 44)    
 
CR is claimed to be about the search for „win-win‟ situations: about „doing well by 
doing good‟. That win-win outcomes are the goal makes full sense: it is good for 
business if they can combine actions that are financially profitable with positive 
societal impacts. The problem is, since companies have to think of their shareholders 
above all other stakeholders, they will foremost guarantee the business part of the 
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win-win. We have already discussed how this puts limits on the extent of good they 
can provide to society: typically CR initiatives rely foremost on communication 
efforts for PR purposes (Frankenthal, 2001). As a result, „win-lose‟ cases, although 
they are almost never reported in CRHA literature, let alone CR reports, are more 
common than win-win outcomes
5
. The discrepancy between the promised beneficial 
action for society and the actual outcome present very real dangers for corporations 
that engage in mostly cosmetic, PR-intensive CR – which we contend is the case for 
most big transnational corporations. In face of what is perceived as deliberate 
deception orchestrated by powerful corporate actors, anti-corporate movements will 
grow, threatening the business status quo. We see it as likely that the near future will 
witness more and more calls for dismantling some of these big „machines‟, and as a 
result it seems to us that a number of situations could become „lose-lose‟. A recent 
example of such lose-lose outcomes is the „water war‟ that opposed the inhabitants of 
El Alto, Bolivia to the French corporation Suez, which eventually was kicked out – a 
case that had previously been publicized as exemplary of best practice by WBCSD 
(Holliday et al., 2002, 164-165). 
In the case of Botnia, history will tell what the long-term financial, societal and 
environmental consequences will be. But what people who read international news are 
aware of today is the political tensions between Uruguay and Argentina resulting from 
the building of the pulp mill: the polarization of opinion between the two countries, 
the activism (Valente, 2005), the brief episodes of militarization around the mill 
(Zibechi, 2007), the legal dispute with several cases at the International Court of 
Justice and the Uruguayan threat to leave Mercosur. As corporations claim further 
responsibilities towards environment and society, they are often mentioned in the 
society pages of newspapers rather than the business section, and mostly in a negative 
light. This bad press on the corporate intrusion into broader societal affairs is likely to 
affect public opinion more than a blind belief in genuine win-win scenarios. 
Is the Botnia case becoming a lose-lose one? At the very least, Botnia‟s image has 
been tarnished by the negative publicity. Could this case become exemplary of 
corporate irresponsibility? As stated previously, our intent is not to present Botnia as a 
particularly „bad‟ company. On the contrary, what we find highly interesting in this 
case is how the company, a member of WBCSD, has acted in a supposedly 
responsible manner in terms of what has been established as „best practice‟ within 
CRHA. We believe it is telling that it is possible to lead to such wide-ranging adverse 
consequences while doing „responsibly‟ what CRHA promotes. 
In the table below, we recapitulate our critical reflections on CRHA. 
 
                                                 
5
 In our view, win-win situations do exist but tend to be anecdotal: when big corporations are involved 
in them, it is mostly for very local cases that can be publicized in CR reports but cannot be reproduced 
throughout their global practices, and even in cases where there would be a systematic search for 
blended value, the financial win would have to take precedence; those smaller companies (e.g. 
Interface or Patagonia) that manage to systematize highly responsible practices can afford to do so 
because their visionary leaders are also their owners. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of CRHA and their related problematic aspects  
 
 Characteristics 
 
Problematic aspects 
Context Sustainable development 
challenges 
 
Dominant neoliberal ideology 
„Sustainable growth‟: an oxymoron 
 
 
Active lobbying against regulation 
 
Thinking Made of „voluntary‟ action 
 
 
Supposed to be „proactive‟ 
 
Lack of accountability since no 
legal basis, most often PR motive 
 
Historically reactive; at best 
financial risk anticipation and 
mitigation 
 
Practice „Best practice‟ 
 
 
Ostensibly claiming social and 
environmental „responsibilities‟ 
Possibility of serious crisis even 
with best practice 
 
Denying responsibility when crisis; 
ultimately „aresponsibility‟ of 
business 
 
Content An abundance of thick reports 
 
 
A heavy reliance on complex, 
„neutral‟ scientific evidence 
Most often not much substance 
beyond the act of reporting itself 
 
Bias often hidden by guise of 
scientific neutrality 
 
Consequences Business-society „win-win‟ 
posited as generalizable 
 
 
Systematic „win-win‟ promises 
Society „win‟ always second, even 
when „blended value‟ sought: often 
„win-lose‟ 
 
Risk of „lose-lose‟ with rise of 
social anger in face of undelivered 
promises 
 
Conclusion: for corporate responsibility? 
 
…a pluralistic society – where there is division, not centralization, of power; 
variety, not unanimity, of opinion; and separation, not unification, of workaday 
economic, political, social and spiritual functions. (Levitt, 1958, 44) 
 
Through our critical reflections, we have shown that little has changed since 
Levitt‟s critique of social responsibility 50 years ago. The two main contextual 
changes have been the threat posed by sustainability questions and the more 
systematic ideological rejection of regulation under neoliberalism. Thus, if CR has 
become so embraced in business circles, it is chiefly because powerful business 
interest groups (especially WBCSD) have articulated a version of CR (here labelled 
CRHA) that can be misleadingly claimed to address the SD challenge while 
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contributing to reduce regulatory pressures. We have discussed why in our view CRHA 
is deeply problematic by showing its inner contradictions through a theoretical 
discussion, a focal case and other illustrations attempting to demonstrate both how 
limited the CR action of even the „most responsible‟ corporations is (e.g. Nokia and 
its suppliers) and how easy it is for the „least responsible‟ corporations to buy 
themselves a good image through CR tricks (e.g. Exxon „saving the tiger‟). 
It is not for us to say whether the misleading nature of CRHA is a matter of false 
consciousness or deliberate deception; we see it as likely that some CR proponents are 
characterized by the former and some by the latter. Those engaging in deliberate 
deception probably do so because of their perceived need for lobbying against 
regulation in order to favour corporate interests. To us there is hope in those who can 
„wake up‟ from their „false consciousness‟. We believe that for this change to occur, 
there is a need to expose how CRHA freezes reality in ways that are likely to make its 
„stakeholders‟ become increasingly anti-corporate in face of extravagant promises not 
delivered (and undeliverable).  
It is certainly one of the merits of CRD that it provides a forum for discussion of 
global social and environmental challenges: even though CRHA has led to hijacking 
SD for business interests, CRD remains open for new articulations that can become 
highly influential… especially if they are at least partly driven by big corporations. 
How to engage these corporations on the way to an accountability that goes beyond 
selective transparency and self-reporting? Some recent normative academic 
articulations look promising, relying on a more transparent political role for 
corporations (see especially Scherer and Palazzo, 2007), but the conditions of 
possibility for such changes to occur remain unclear at this stage. This proposed 
„politicization of the corporation‟ (ibid., 1115) would probably result in less political 
power for business interest groups who hitherto have preferred to exert their 
overwhelming political influence through (far from transparent) lobbying at the 
highest levels of national, regional and global governance; it is highly unlikely that 
corporations would proactively accept this relative loss of power. However, if a 
consensus develops in civil society seeing the self-regulation paradigm as largely part 
of the problem rather than the solution, it will be harder for CR to remain a matter of 
„responsibility‟ rather than more extensive accountability. The good news is, there are 
indications that „[such a] consensus is currently forming‟ (Rowe, 2005, 166) and that 
partly as a result of this shift, powerful business movements lobbying for more 
legislation are appearing (e.g. USCAP). We see these trends as encouraging, as we 
firmly believe that a certain amount of (international) regulation will be needed to 
mitigate the overwhelming potential for social and environmental nuisance of the 
global free market. 
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Appendix 1:  Description of the Botnia case in Fray Bentos 
 
The case of the „cellulose plant conflict between Argentina and Uruguay‟ 
(Wikipedia, 2008) is presented as an „diplomatic, economic and public relations 
conflict, which has affected tourism and transportation, as well as the otherwise 
amicable relations between the two countries‟, in an unprecedented feud between two 
countries that share „the same accent, same culture, and now similar centre-left 
governments‟ (Wikipedia, 2008). Its starting point can be traced to 2002, when 
Spanish company ENCE received permission from the Uruguayan government to 
build a cellulose pulp mill in the small Uruguayan town of Fray Bentos, situated by 
the Uruguay-river which is the natural border between Uruguay and Argentina 
(Valente, 2005). The plans met opposition in Argentina, particularly in the 
neighbouring town of Gualeguaychú. The initial opposition did not lead to strong 
protests, and Finnish company Metsä-Botnia (international name Botnia) was granted 
permission to build its own pulp mill in early 2005. In April 2005, around 35,000 
protestors blocked the international bridge linking Gualeguaychú and Fray Bentos 
(Pierri, 2005). As protest grew several important bridges were blocked, preventing 
movements between the two countries at the high point of tourist season. Uruguay 
accused Argentina of violating Mercosur principles while Argentina formally asked to 
suspend the factories‟ construction. In January 2006 Argentina took the issue to the 
International Court of Justice, accusing Uruguay of violating the bilateral Treaty of 
Uruguay River, which requires the countries to inform each other of any undertaking 
that would affect the river. Uruguay retaliated claiming that the blockades are clear 
breaches of the principles of general international law and the Mercosur rules. In 
March 2006, Botnia agreed to suspend the construction of its mill for a maximum of 
90 days in order to favour dialogue between Uruguay and Argentina on this issue, in 
line with presidential requests from both countries. A week later Botnia revised its 
statement saying that it would suspend the construction only for 10 days. On April 18 
constructions resumed, leading to further blockades and tension in the area which 
resulted in Uruguay threatening to file a WTO complaint. In May, Argentina‟s 
complaint at the International Court of Justice was formally presented. In June the 
Mercosur tribunal examined Uruguay‟s complaints. No clear „winner‟ emerged. In 
September, ENCE decided to cancel its project, citing the impossibility to build two 
plants in Fray Bentos as the reason. In October a World Bank study (through the 
International Finance Corporation; IFC, 2006) concluded that the mill would not 
cause environmental harm while generating economic benefits for Uruguay. The 
Argentine Environment Secretary rejected the study claiming that it „did not provide 
any new data‟ but rather employed results of previous studies conducted for Botnia 
and ENCE, while also claiming „"substantial errors" in the study (Wikipedia, 2008). 
Later developments were described as a „militarization of the pulp mill conflict‟ 
(Zibechi, 2007), as by the end of November, the Uruguayan government sent armed 
forces to guard the Botnia mill. Uruguay also threatened to leave Mercosur, thus 
questioning years of peaceful integration with its neighbours. The mill started 
operating in November 2007. 
 
 
 
